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Abstract-Regulation, vertical integration, demand uncertainty, and risk aversion are 
combined into a single model. Under quite reasonable conditions, it is possible to show that 
the output of the integrated firm in the regulated stage will be greater than that of the 
corresponding nonintegrated firm. Implications for public policy are also discussed. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
An extensive economic literature has developed concerning the effects of imperfect informa- 
tion and risk aversion on the behavior of economic agents. The results which emerge from 
many of these models differ from those derived using the perfectly competitive assumptions. 
This divergence casts doubt on the relevance of static certainty models as a basis for the 
formation of public policy in a dynamic uncertain world. Public utility regulation and vertical 
integration are two areas which have been noticeably affected by the developments in the 
economics of uncertainty. 
Recent papers by Meyer [l], Peles and Stein [2], and Perrakis [3], concerning the effects 
of uncertainty on the behavior of regulated monopolists raise fundamental questions about 
the relevance of the Averch-Johnson (AJ) [4] over capitalization effect, the foundation of the 
theory of rate of return regulation for almost twenty years. The existence of the AJ effect 
depends on the precise manner in which uncertainty enters into the firm’s decision 
environment. In some cases, it is actually reversed [2]. Even if the effect is operational in the 
usual direction, its magnitude may be reduced for a firm that is risk averse [l]. These results 
should indicate to public utility commissioners that uncertainty and a firm’s attitude toward 
risk cannot be ignored in the design of a regulatory constraint. 
Uncertainty or lack of perfect information is often discussed as one of the causes for 
market failure; that is, a breakdown of the competitive system. It is conceivable that a firm 
may respond to uncertainty by attempting to gain more control over its decision environment. 
One way to accomplish this goal is to substitute internal organization for participation in a 
market process. Vertical integration is one such structural response. It has long been 
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acknowledged [5] that the incentive to integrate vertically is absent in the static certainty 
setting of the competitive model. However, rigorous analysis of the claim that uncertainty 
provides the incentive for the firm to integrate vertically has not been attempted to any 
significant degree. Arrow [6] and Green [7] are the well known exceptions. A more recent 
attempt to model vertical integration under uncertainty by Carlton [8] considers both input 
and output firms facing demand uncertainty; vertical integration upstream occurs in order 
to obtain an assured supply of an input. Unfortunately, the results of this model do not 
provide unambiguous welfare implications. Either more of the input is produced or fewer 
customers are satisfied than in the nonintegrated case, but socially desirable technologies are 
more likely to appear in vertically integrated structures as a result of the improved 
coordination between the stages of production. Another recent contribution to the vertical 
integration literature is a paper by Klein, Crawford, and Alchian [9] in which vertical 
integration is characterized as a means of reducing the costs associated with the risk of 
appropriation of some part of the quasirents ( = revenue-operating costs-salvage value) 
associated with certain specialized assets. The oil industry is offered as an example of an 
industry in which the threat of appropriation exists. Vertical integration of crude exploration 
and production, transportation (pipeline). refining, and marketing is a way to eliminate this 
threat of opportunistic behavior. 
Vertical integration in the oil industry has concerned policymakers for many years. One 
stage which has been intensely scrutinized is the transportation of crude and refined products 
via pipelines. This is a difficult aspect of the industry to analyze since pipelines, in addition 
to being part of the vertically integrated chain, exhibit natural monopoly characteristics (cost 
efficiency and economies of scale) and are subject to rate of return regulation. A detailed 
analysis of the pipeline industry and the current regulatory climate is contained in Mitchell 
[lo]. The Department of Justice has taken the position that some vertically integrated 
pipeline firms have the incentive to limit the amount of oil that travels to the downstream 
market by pipeline forcing some oil to move downstream by alternative (more expensive) 
modes of transportation. The downstream market price, thus, reflects the cost of the 
alternative mode. The difference between the downstream price and the cost of pipeline 
transportation is profit for the pipeline shippers. If those shippers are also owners of the 
pipeline company, then the vertically integrated firm has circumvented rate of return 
regulation. One remedy proposed by the Department for this type of regulatory evasion is 
divestiture.” The economic foundation for the Department’s theory appears to be a static 
certainty model developed by Reynolds [ 111 designed to explore “the extent to which vertical 
integration by oil pipelines has allowed the evasion of regulation” [l 1, p. 731. 
The oil industry representatives offer a counterargument [lo] which questions the wisdom 
of judging decisions made by risk averse firms in a dynamic uncertain decision environment 
on the basis of a static certainty model. They point out that there is uncertainty about future 
demand for pipeline services, and they are reluctant to support independent pipeline 
companies with shipping guarantees without an opportunity to share in the rewards from a 
favorable realization of the uncertainty. The industry claims raise some fundamental 
theoretical issues regarding the behavior of a vertically integrated regulated firm under 
uncertainty which must be resolved before a clear recommendation for public policy emerges. 
This paper attempts to combine the characteristics-rate of return regulation, vertical 
“Another remedy suggested by the Department of Justice involves a set of competitive rules for joint venture 
pipeline systems. These rules preserve the vertically integrated structure of firms in the oil industry but alter the 
incentives of those firms that participate in joint ventures. The specific rules which have been proposed (see [lo]) are 
(i) open and nondiscriminatory access to the pipeline for all shippers, (ii) any pipeline owner or shipper can request 
and obtain expansion of pipeline capacity, (iii) the pipeline company must provide open ownership to all shippers 
at a price equal to replacement cost less economic depreciation, and (iv) annual adjustment of ownership shares to 
reflect each owner’s share of average throughput. 
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integration, demand uncertainty, and risk aversion-into a single model. A regulated 
monopolist vertically integrated downstream is considered. The firm produces an output in 
the regulated stage which is either used as an input in the downstream production process 
or sold in an imperfectly competitive market. Therefore, this firm faces demand uncertainty 
in both stages of its operation. In addition, the firm is risk averse which means that there 
exists a concave utility of profit function for the firm; the firm seeks to maximize expected utility 
of profit subject to an Averch-Johnson-type rate of return constraint involving the expected 
profit from all production at the regulated stage. It is possible to show, under quite reasonable 
conditions, that the output of the firm in the regulated stage will be greater than that produced 
by the corresponding nonintegrated firm. This contrasts sharply with the static certainty result 
of Reynolds that vertical integration enables the regulated monopolist to evade regulation 
and, thus, restrict output. If, as the oil industry representatives suggest, the firms under 
consideration actually face demand uncertainty and are risk averse, the model developed in 
this paper reinforces the industry claim that social welfare would not necessarily be enhanced 
by divestiture. On the other hand, it is not possible to conclude that the oil industry is free 
of competitive problems; this model is merely an illustration of the need for policymakers 
to exercise caution when using static certainty economic models as the basis for condemning 
some forms of economic organization. However, the static uncertainty model presented in 
this paper may not be descriptive of the decision environment in which a pipeline firm 
operates. Additional research is clearly necessary regarding the applicability of the model to 
the pipeline industry. 
The remainder of this paper is divided into three sections. The model is formulated for 
both quantity setting and price setting monopolists (Sets. II and III), and then the resulting 
welfare implications and comparisons to the other models are presented (Sec. IV). 
II. STRUCTURE OF THE PROBLEM 
The model in this paper is similar to that constructed by Meyer [I] for the regulated, risk 
averse, nonintegrated monopolist. In this case, the firm is involved in two adjacent stages of 
the production process. The production technology in the initial stage requires two inputs 
(capital and labor) which the firm purchases in perfectly competitive markets. Production in 
the downstream stage also requires two inputs: one is produced in the initial stage and the 
other input (not capital) is purchased in a perfectly competitive market. The usual 
assumptions of positive marginal products and diminishing returns apply to both stages. The 
firm uses a fixed percentage (_< 100%) of the output of the initial stage as an input into the 
downstream stage. The remaining output is sold in an imperfectly competitive market. The 
firm is a monopolist in this initial market and, thus, subject to a regulatory constraint. The 
regulatory environment is such that the constraint applies to the total amount produced in 
this stage; that is, the firm’s downstream operation is regarded as an independent buyer of 
the product, and it must pay the same price as any other buyer for a unit of the regulated 
output. The firm faces a simplified rate of return constraint involving only the expected profit 
from the regulated stage. Similar to the constraint in the AJ model, the expected net allowable 
revenue from the regulated stage may not exceed a given percentage of some fixed value of 
the firm’s capital stock. 
The incorporation of uncertainty and the firm’s risk averse attitude into the decision 
problem is accomplished in the standard way. This means that the firm faces random inverse 
demand schedules in the regulated and downstream stages. The corresponding expected 
revenue functions are increasing at decreasing rates in their respective arguments. Total profit 
for the firm equals regulated profit plus downstream profit. The firm’s risk averse attitude 
is captured by assuming that there exists a utility of profit function which is increasing at 
a decreasing rate. The Principle of Increasing Uncertainty is also satisfied; that is, the 
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dispersion (riskiness) of total revenue increases as total expected revenue increases for changes 
in price or output. Given the random demand, the general form of the monopolist’s decision 
problem is 
subject to technical, market, and institutional constraints, where U(X) is a cardinal utility of 
profit function and E is the mathematical expectation operator. The effect of demand 
uncertainty on firm behavior depends on which of the available control variables must be 
selected before (ex ante) and which can be selected after (ex post) the resolution of the 
random event. For example, if all control variables can be determined ex post, the monopolist 
faces a certainty decision problem of the standard form. The choice between price or quantity 
of output as a control variable in this case is immaterial. However, due to technical, market 
and institutional factors, some of the firm’s decision variables must be selected ex ante. It 
is known a priori that the firm’s expected utility of profit diminishes as more of its decision 
variables are selected prior to the realization of the random event. 
Suppose, for example, the vertically integrated firm is a quantity setter; it must determine 
the capital stock, the output of the regulated stage, and the output of the downstream stage 
ex ante. The remaining variables are selected ex post. Given this decision sequence, the firm’s 
objective is to select nonnegative quantities for the ex ante decision variables so as to 
maximize expected utility of profit subject to a regulatory constraint of the AJ type. Analysis 
of the first order conditions for this constrained optimization problem yields conditions which 
can be compared to those previously derived for a nonintegrated firm in both certain and 
uncertain decision environments. It is possible to demonstrate that an integrated, risk averse 
firm produces more in the regulated stage than the corresponding nonintegrated monopolist. 
This result illustrates the differences in the reactions of the integrated and nonintegrated risk 
averse firms to the presence of demand uncertainty. The integrated firm is concerned that the 
demand for the output of the regulated stage will be greater than expected so that an 
insufficient amount of this output will be available for its own downstream operation. The 
nonintegrated firm, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with avoiding losses if demand 
is less than expected. This is consistent with other analyses of risk averse behavior in which 
firms forego the possibility of large profits to guard against large losses. 
The above discussion is an overview of the model. The next section contains a rigorous 
exposition of the model for both quantity setting and price setting firms. 
III. MODEL 
In order to focus on the output decision in the regulated stage, it is necessary to make some 
simplifying assumptions about the environment in which the firm operates: 
(1) Consider a quantity setting firm that is vertically integrated through two stages of a 
production process. 
(2) The output of the initial stage Q requires two inputs---capital K and labor L; that is, 
Q = Q(K, L) with 
aQ aQ a'Q a2Q - 
32 aL >O and aK2, =<O. 
The output of the downstream stage W requires two inputs-output from the initial stage 
Q and another input M; that is, W = W(Q, 44) with 
aw aw -- 
ap am 
a2w a2wco, 
> 0 and - __ 
aQ.2’ ah42 
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The inputs K, L, and A4 are purchased in perfectly competitive markets at prices r, W, and 
W, respectively. 
(3) The firm is a monopolist in the market for Q and, thus, subject to a rate of return 
constraint. A unit of Q is either sold or used by the firm to produce W. The price of Q depends 
on the total amount produced; that is, the firm faces a random inverse demand schedule 
t(Q, v) such that 
at at - 
aQ 
< 0 and av > 0. 
v is a random element with finite moments. The corresponding revenue function is concave. 
The rate-of-return constraint applies to the revenue generated by the total amount of Q 
produced. The regulatory commission determines ex ante an allowed rate of return s 
applicable to the total amount of K used by the firm. The expected profit from the regulated 
stage operation must be less than or equal to (S - T)K.~ 
(4) The price of W is determined in an imperfectly competitive market; that is, p = p( W, p) 
such that 
ap ap _ ~0 and - >O. 
aw ap 
p is a random element with finite moments. The corresponding revenue function is concave. 
(5) There exists cc~[O, 1] which represents the fraction of Q production retained by the firm 
for use in production of W, (1 - cc) denotes the fraction of Q production that the firm sells. 
If SL = 0, then W = 0 and M = 0 (nonintegrated case). 
(6) The firm selects W, Q, and K ex ante. L and M are ex post decision variables. 
L = L(K, Q) and M = M( W, aQ) with 
aL a=L ax aM a94 a94 aL aM ----- 
@ ap at?' aw3 aw=' a@ > 0 and - aK’ aQ < 0. 
Also, L and M are convex in their respective arguments. 
(7) Total profit n for the firm is the sum of profit from the downstream operation and 
that from sales of the regulated stage output. The firm is risk averse; specifically, there exists 
a von Neuman-Morgenstern utility function u such that u’(n) > 0 and U”(Z) < 0. The firm 
selects nonnegative values of W, Q and K which maximize the expected utility of profit Eu(x) 
subject to the rate of return constraint that the expected profit from the entire amount of 
Q produced is less than or equal to (S - r)K.’ 
(8) The Principle of Increasing Uncertainty is satisfied; that is, the riskiness of total 
revenue increases as expected total revenue increases for changes in price or output. 
Formally, the problem for the firm is 
~;,;[Eu(n) = Mp(W, P)W + (1 - aMQ, v>Q - rk - W4K Q> + M(K aQN)l (1) 
subject to W, Q, K 2 0 and E(t(Q, v)Q - rK - wL(K, Q)) I (s - r)K. 
the regulatory constraint applies to the total profit the firm expects to earn from the regulated stage. The firm 
must regard its own downstream operation as a separate entity when computing the revenue subject to the regulatory 
constraint. 
‘This is a rate of return which may be. earned on average. 
92 RICHARD P. ROZEK 
If rr, = c(Q, v)Q - rK - wL(K, Q), then the Lagrangian function ,I is 
A(W, Q, K, 2) = Eu(n) + A((s - r)K - E(q)), 
where ,? is the Lagrange multiplier. The necessary and sufficient conditions for a maximum 
ared 
g$ = E[u’(7c)(p + pww - WM,)] = 0 
a/i 
- = E[u’(rc)((l - a)(t + tpQ) - w(& + LxM~))] - IE(t + r,Q - w&) = 0 
aQ 
an 
aK = E[u’(n)( - r - wLJ] + A[(s - r) - E( - r - wLJ] = 0 
g=(s-r)K-E(lQ-rK-wL)=O, (5) 
where all variables and partial derivatives are evaluated at the equilibrium 
(W*, Q*, K*, A*) 2 0 and 
akt ahf 
Mw=TJ$ M,=qj 
aP at 
PW=aj$ ‘Q=s 
aL aL 
LQ=@ L”=z. 
From Eq. (4), the marginal rate of input substitution is 
aL r A*(s - r) --=-- 
aK w w[Eu’(n*)-A*]’ 
This is obviously similar to the certainty case analyzed by Averch and Johnson [4]. From Eq. 
(3) 
E(u’(n*)) - 1* = - 
cov(u’(n*), MR* - MC*) + cxE(u’(n*)(MR* + wMZ;)) 
E(MR* - MC*) E(MR* -MC*) ’ 
(6) 
where 
MR* = t(Q*, v)+ Q*tQ(Q*, v) and MC* = wL;S. 
Following the analysis of Holthausen [12], the concavity of u (risk aversion) means that 
cov(u’(n*), MR* - MC*) < 0 given at/& > 0 and the Principle of Increasing Uncertainty.’ 
Meyer [l] analyzes the decision problem for a nonintegrated, regulated, and risk averse 
%ince the revenue functions are concave and L and M are convex, R is a concave function. Since u is concave, 
a point that satisfies the first order conditions is a maximum for the problem. 
The Principle of Increasing Uncertainty is equivalent to the requirement that aMR(Q, p)/ap and E(MR(Q, p)) 
have the same sign. 
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monopolist (~1 = 0). He derives the following results for the equilibrium solution (0, k, l) 2 0: 
(i) Eu’(72) - E: = - 
cov(u’(2), &?R - tic) 
E(MR - AC) ’ 
(7) 
(ii) Eu’(72) - II 2 0, 
(iii) E(A?R - AC) > 0 for a risk averse firm, where 
kR=t@,v@+t(~,v) and &?C=IV~(&&=~&. 
8Q 
He concludes that the output expansion and price reduction effects of the AJ model are 
preserved under the assumptions of demand uncertainty and risk neutrality. However, risk 
aversion exerts a moderating influence on these effects. Output is limited by the requirement 
that E(A.?R - AC) > 0. 
If the regulated monopolist is vertically integrated downstream (0 < IY I l), then 
Eu’(Tc*) - A* 2 0. It is apparent from Eq. (6) that expected marginal revenue greater than 
marginal cost is no longer necessary for this inequality to hold. The vertically integrated firm 
may produce a larger output in the regulated stage than the corresponding nonintegrated 
firm. The exact relationship which must hold in order for E(MR* - MC*) I 0 involves the 
degree of vertical integration E. Specifically, if 
cI 2 E(u’(x *)MR *) - E(u’(n))E(MR *) > o 
E(u’(n *)MR *) + wMZ;Eu’(n *) ’ 
then the vertically integrated firm will select Q* such that E(MR* - MC*) IO and, thus, 
Q*>o. 
Equations (6) and (7) summarize the difference between the risk averse firm involved only 
in production of Q and the risk averse firm producing both Q and W. The firms react 
differently even though both prefer reasonable and secure policies (risk aversion). Intuitively, 
the nonintegrated firm is primarily concerned with avoiding losses if demand is less than 
expected, but the vertically integrated firm is concerned that demand for Q will be higher than 
expected so that an insufficient amount of Q will be available for its own downstream 
operation. In addition, to the extent that there is substitutability between Q and M in the 
production of Wand supply of A4 is uncertain, the risk averse firm may choose an input mix 
that favors the input it produces, thus accentuating the tendency to produce more output in 
the regulated stage than the nonintegrated firm. Concern over unexpected demand and an 
assured source of supply of an input, form the underlying rationale for the vertically 
integrated firm’s production decision in the regulated stage. 
If a price setting firm is considered, then t, p, and K are determined ex 
yyy[Wn) = Eu(pW(p, P) + (1 - a)tQ(t, v) - rK - w(L(Q(t, v), K) 
. . 
+ M(W(P, P), aQ(c vN)l 
subject to t, p, K 2 0 and 
E(tQ(t,v)-rK-wL(Q(t,v),K))<(s-r)K. 
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rk~, K Y) = WPWP, PL) + (1 - ~)tQ(t, v> - rK - W<Q<4 v>, K)
+ M(@‘(P, ~1, Mi?(h v>>>l+ ~(6 - r)K - E(tQ(t, v> 
- rK - wL(Q(t, VI, KN), 
where y is the Lagrange multiplier. The necessary and sufficient conditions for a maximum 
are 
ar 
at =-%‘(n)(t(l - a)Q,+(l -u)Q(t,v)- w(&Q,+~~~Qt)l 
-yE(tQ,+Q -w&Q,)=0 
ar -= E[u'(7c)(pWp+ w- wM,W,)]=O 
ap 
g=E[u’(n)(-r-wL,)]+y(s-r-E(-r-wL,))=O 
ar 
ay = (s - r)K - E(tQ - rK - wL) = 0, 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
where all variables and partial derivatives are evaluated at the equilibrium 
(t*,p*, K*, y*) 2 0 and 
L 2 L=ar, 
Q aQ' K aK' 
Similar to the case for the quantity setting firm it is possible to rewrite Eq. (10) to obtain’ 
cov(u’(71), - LK) Y(S - r) 
Ed(n) - y - w(Eu’(n) - y)’ 
Again, Eu’(n) - y 2 0 and from Eq. (8) 
Ed(n) - y = - 
COW(~), tQ,+ Q - wLpQl)+cW(WQ~+ Q wMgQr)l 
E(tQ,+wL,Qt) E(tQ,+Q -w-&Q,) ' 
According to Holthausen, risk aversion is equivalent to the condition cov(u’(n), 
- aL/aK) < 0; therefore, if c1 > 0, the firm is not restricted to selection of an output level in 
the regulated stage such that expected marginal revenue is greater than expected marginal 
cost. Again, depending on the degree of vertical integration, it is possible that the risk averse 
integrated firm produces a larger output in the regulated stage than the corresponding 
nonintegrated firm. 
‘In order to rule out the possibility that the firm does not produce Q, assume that price is greater than the marginal 
cost of production. 
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The comparison between the integrated and nonintegrated firms is valid given that both 
firms have the same degree of risk aversion. It is well known [12] that a firm will reduce its 
optimal level of capital stock (one input into the production of Q) as aversion to risk 
increases. Therefore, if the vertically integrated firm is more risk averse than the nonintegrated 
firm, it is possible that the integrated firm selects a level of capital stock (thus output in the 
regulated stage) less than or equal to that chosen by the nonintegrated firm. On the other 
hand, if the nonintegrated firm is more risk averse, the output expansion effect of vertical 
integration is reinforced. It is impossible to determine in general if the degrees of risk aversion 
for integrated and nonintegrated firms differ. 
IV. WELFARE IMPLICATIONS AND COMPARISONS TO OTHER MODELS 
The welfare implications of many results in the economics of uncertainty have not been 
resolved. In the present context, the crucial question for public policy is whether or not 
vertical integration and rate of return regulation cause resources to be allocated inefficiently. 
It is well known that when all other industries are perfectly competitive, and a monopolist 
hires factors in perfectly competitive markets, resources will not be efficiently allocated since 
the monopolist will charge a price in excess of marginal cost. This is the standard antitrust 
rationale for restricting market power. Yet, the AJ thesis asserts that the regulated monopolist 
also misallocates resources by choosing to utilize too much capital in order to enhance its 
rate base. In the presence of uncertainty and risk aversion, as incorporated into the above 
model, vertical integration increases output and decreases price compared to the non- 
integrated case. However, since neither the model of an unregulated monopolist nor the AJ 
model of regulation provides an efficient allocation of resources, equivalent to the competitive 
model, any result of this model relative to these two is not open to evaluation. Such a welfare 
judgement must be deferred until a second best criterion capable of assessing the regulated 
environment is developed. 
The model constructed by Reynolds [l 1] utilizes a static certainty setting for a profit 
maximizing firm integrated into a downstream market and faced with a binding rate of return 
constraint in its initial stage of operation. The production technology at the regulated stage 
involves only one input (capital). Total profits for the firm are obviously the sum of its profits 
from the regulated and unregulated stages. The firm is a monopolist in the regulated stage 
but not necessarily in the unregulated stage. The model allows for the possibility that the 
regulated entity has many owners who may act as competitors in the other stage. The owners 
of the regulated entity have a share of total industry profits which is less than or equal to 
100%. Reynolds concludes that if the vertically integrated firm’s share of industry profits is 
sufficiently large, then the firm is able to evade regulation by using at the regulated stage less 
capital and, thus, producing a smaller output than the corresponding nonintegrated, 
regulated firm. 
This contrasts sharply with the model presented in Sec. III wherein the integrated, 
regulated, risk averse firm selects a larger output than an equivalent nonintegrated firm. This 
result has profound implications regarding divestiture as a remedy for competitive problems. 
Divestiture would create an industry composed of regulated, nonintegrated firms. If the real 
world is characterized by uncertainty and risk averse firms, this model would predict that 
regulated output would be less than in the case that diverstiture did not occur-the opposite 
effect intended by such a remedy. 
As discussed above, one application of the notion of regulatory evasion through vertical 
integration has been to the pipeline industry. Therefore if K,,,, K,, &, denote the pipeline 
sizes for the unregulated, Reynolds, and Averch-Johnson monopolists, respectively, then we 
know that Km < K, < Ku. Given regulation and risk aversion, K,, < KM, Km < KM, and 
K,, < K, where Ku and k;, denote the pipeline sizes selected by the nonintegrated and 
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integrated firms, respectively, and KAI corresponds to the pipeline size chosen by both risk 
neutral integrated and nonintegrated firms. Further comparisons are impossible. Because 
only a limited amount of comparability exists among the models, some issues are not resolved 
by theoretical analysis alone. For example, even knowing the above inequalities, no 
determination of the relationship of K,,,, with K,,, and K, is possible. Therefore, undersizing, 
if it actually occurs, is a phenomenon which must be investigated empirically. 
To determine the appropriate public policy regarding oil pipelines, it is important to 
question which model is the better approximation of a pipeline firm’s decision environment. 
If it is Reynolds’ static certainty model, then divestiture could be an appropriate remedy for 
the abuses which exist as a result of vertically integrated firms evading regulation. If it is the 
static uncertainty model, divestiture may have adverse economic consequences. On the other 
hand, neither model may be an accurate description of a firm in the pipeline industry, 
requiring additional research to develop a model which is more descriptive of the decision 
environment in which a pipeline firm operates. 
In assessing the relevance of the model presented in Sec. III for use in analyzing the pipeline 
industry, a number of issues must be addressed. First, vertical integration is exogenous in the 
model. This prohibits consideration of the firm’s decisions regarding the optimal degree of 
vertical integration. Second, there is a lack of empirical support for the model. The 
availability of information to verify the assumptions of the model must be investigated. Third, 
the intense antitrust scrutiny given to the oil industry in the past may add constraints to the 
firm’s decision environment which are not captured in the model. Fourth, the firm in the 
model is vertically integrated into only two stages of the production process. Many firms in 
the oil industry, on the other hand, are integrated throughout the entire production process 
from crude exploration to product marketing. This multistage aspect of integration may 
introduce factors into the firm’s decision environment which significantly alter behavior from 
that described in the model. Finally, the model is static. A dynamic model must ultimately 
be constructed in order to understand the pipeline decision process with regard to such 
questions as the optimal time for entry into a given market and alternative means of (i) 
attaining a given capacity as well as (ii) expanding capacity. If these or other factors not 
explicitly taken into account in constructing the model of a vertically integrated, regulated, 
risk averse firm are significant determinants of pipeline firm behavior, then this model will 
have only limited use in the formation of public policy regarding the pipeline industry. 
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